Self-Insurance and Self-Protection as Public Goods by Schmidt, Ulrich et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Schmidt, Ulrich; Robledo, Julio R.; Lohse, Tim
Working Paper
Self-Insurance and Self-Protection as
Public Goods
Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics,
No. 2007,16
Provided in cooperation with:
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (CAU)
Suggested citation: Schmidt, Ulrich; Robledo, Julio R.; Lohse, Tim (2007) : Self-Insurance and
Self-Protection as Public Goods, Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität
Kiel, Department of Economics, No. 2007,16, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22032Self-Insurance and Self-Protection as Public 
Goods
by Tim Lohse, Julio R. Robledo, and Ulrich Schmidt
Economics Working Paper
No 2007-16Self-Insurance and Self-Protection
as Public Goods
Tim Lohse, Julio R. Robledo, and Ulrich Schmidt∗
July 2, 2007
Abstract
Many public goods like lighthouses and ﬁre departments do not provide direct
utility but act as insurance devices against shipwreck and destruction. They either
diminish the size and/or the probability of the loss. We extend the public good
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when self-insurance and self-protection expenditures are pure public goods. Some
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provided levels of self-insurance and self-protection decrease when market insurance is
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those are better observable than private self-protection eﬀort.
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Many standard textbook examples for public goods like lighthouses and ﬁre departments
do not provide intrinsic direct utility but act as insurance devices against shipwreck and
destruction. In their seminal contribution, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) coined the terms
“self-insurance” for eﬀort that reduces the size of the loss and “self-protection” for eﬀort
that reduces the probability of the loss. Thus, a ﬁre department nearby does not prevent
a ﬁre, but it reduces the size of the loss.1 Similarly, a lighthouse or a national army do not
lower the size of the loss but they lower the probability of shipwreck or war.2 Public ﬁre
stations can be seen as self-protection devices and lighthouses and national armies act as
self-insurance devices.
The standard literature usually assumes that the level of the public good is a direct func-
tional argument of the individual’s utility function, irrespective of whether the public good
is provided publicly or privately (for a survey, see e.g. Cornes and Sandler, 1996). How-
ever, this assumption is not always realistic because the public goods mentioned above
do not provide utility by their sheer existence, but they act as self-protection and self-
insurance devices. With few exceptions, the literature on public goods has not analyzed
these insurance aspects. The public goods literature has dealt with uncertainty focusing
on the private provision. The standard result is that uncertainty reduces the free-riding
incentive depending on the properties of the third derivatives of the utility function.3 So
far, the literature has always concentrated on uncertainty about the contributions of the
other individuals or about their contribution behavior.
One recent contribution by Ihori and McGuire (2007) considers the collective provision
towards a self-protection device and shows how the contributions to risk collective reduction
depend on the risk aversion of the individuals. Our paper complements and extends
this approach by establishing the theoretical similarities between the standard model of
private contributions to a public good and the insurance model of private contributions
to a collective self-protection or self-insurance device. We show that the role of income
1Orszag and Stiglitz (2002) have analyzed the eﬃcient provision level of ﬁre departments as public
goods.
2Here we follow textbook economics in modeling lighthouses as public goods, despite Coase’s (1974)
analysis of lighthouses as private goods. For an analysis of collective eﬀorts of armies and terrorism, see
Sandler (2005).
3See the contributions of Austen-Smith (1980), Sandler et al. (1987), Gradstein et al. (1993), among
others.
2normality in the standard model is analogous to the role of risk aversion in the insurance
model.
Thus, we also extend the seminal contribution by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) to the situation
where self-insurance and self-protection are public goods with non-rival consumption. We
develop modiﬁed Samuelson conditions (Samuelson 1954, 1955) characterizing the eﬃcient
provision level of those public goods and analyze the provision level when self-insurance
and self-protection as public goods are privately provided. Moreover, we investigate for
both cases the impact of the presence of market insurance on the provision level of the
public good. Our results show that the eﬃcient level of the public good decreases if fair
market insurance is available. It is well-known that individuals will buy full insurance if
insurance premiums are fair (Mossin, 1968). In this case, the eﬃcient level of the public
good will maximize expected wealth; i. e., it equals the eﬃcient level for risk neutral
individuals which is lower than the eﬃcient level for risk averse subjects. Consequently,
the state should invest more in public self-insurance and self-protection in case of events
which are not insurable, e.g. wars or nuclear incidents.
In the case of public self-protection in the presence of market insurance, we assume real-
istically that the level of the public good can be observed by insurers and hence reduces
premiums in an actuarial fair way. This means that a moral hazard problem does not oc-
cur in the case of public self-protection, which may be an advantage compared to private
self-protection eﬀorts which are often not observable.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model and the modiﬁed
Samuelson conditions for the eﬃcient provision level of self-insurance and self-protection
as public goods. The comparative statics results for changes in income and risk behavior
are presented in section 3. In section 4 the additional possibility of a market insurance
is introduced and the relating eﬃciency conditions are derived. Section 5 presents the
Nash equilibria when the self-insurance and self-protection are privately provided public
goods. Section 6 introduces the individual choice that maximizes expected utility when
public self-insurance and self-protection can be complemented or substituted with market
insurance. Section 7 summarizes the results and concludes.
32 Eﬃcient provision of the public good
Consider an economy with i = 1,...,n individuals facing two possible states of the world,
1 and 2. All individuals have the same probability p of suﬀering a loss L, while with
residual probability 1 − p there is no loss. Each individual i is endowed with income mi
which she may spend on increasing the level of the public good G with a non-negative
contribution gi ≥ 0. The public good G diminishes the size of the loss or the probability
of the loss in a way to be described in the following sections. For convenience and without
loss of generality, we set the marginal cost of contributing to the public good to 1. This
leads to the following state contingent income levels:
yi1 = mi − gi (1)
yi2 = mi − gi − L, (2)
where yij denotes the income of individual i in state j. All n individuals have the same von
Neumann utility function u with increasing and diminishing returns to state-contingent
income, u0(yij) > 0,u00(yij) < 0. We further assume for our comparative static results that
all individuals are prudent, u000(yij) > 0. A positive third derivative concerns the optimal
choice under uncertainty. Intuitively, a prudent individual reacts to uncertainty by increas-
ing the choice variable to avoid extreme situations (see Kimball (1990) on precautionary
saving).
2.1 Self-insurance as a public good
In the self-insurance case, for all individuals the size of the loss L depends on the level of
the public good G, L(G), where G is the sum of all private contributions to the public
good; i. e., G =
Pn
i=1 gi. One can think, for instance, of the loss due to a ﬁre. The size
of the loss depends on the number of ﬁre stations and on the distance to the next ﬁre
station. Thus, the existence of ﬁre stations is a public good. It is reasonable to assume
that the public good reduces the size of the loss with diminishing productivity: L0(G) < 0
and L00(G) > 0. We further assume that it is worthwhile to invest in loss reduction, i. e.
limG→0 L0(G) → −∞, and that it does not pay to spend all income on self-insurance eﬀort,
i. e. limy→0 u0(y) → ∞. The state contingent income levels are given by
yi1 = mi − gi (3)
yi2 = mi − gi − L(G), (4)
4where G acts as an self-insurance device: it involves redistributing income from the good
state of the world to the bad state.
The individual i maximizes her expected utility given by
EUi(gi,G) = (1 − p)U(mi − gi) + pU(mi − gi − L(G)) = (1 − p)Ui1 + pUi2, (5)




The ﬁrst-best, Pareto eﬃcient outcome for n > 1 is found when the expected utility level of
individual 1 EU1 is maximized, given the restrictions that individuals 2 to n obtain given
expected utility levels EUj,j = 2,...,n and that G =
Pn
i=1 gi. The resulting Lagrangian
for this problem is
L = EU1 +
n X
j=2















SI)) + λ = 0 (7)
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i2) + λ = 0, for i = 1,...,n, (8)
where µ1 = 1. Let the superscript ∗ denote the eﬃcient level of the public good, and




i. Solving each of the n equations (8) for µi, substituting into (7) and
canceling out λ, we obtain
Proposition 1 (Eﬃcient level of public self-insurance)
The Pareto eﬃcient level of a public good G which acts as a self-insurance device is given









where the Inada assumptions imply that p · (−L0(G∗
SI)) > 1, i. e., that the expected
marginal value of the eﬃcient self-insurance eﬀort level is larger than its marginal cost.
The left hand side reﬂects the willingness to pay for the public good G: the marginal
positive eﬀect of an additional unit of G, measured in units of forgone income in both
states of the world (marginal expected utility EU0
i). Since an additional unit of G beneﬁts
5all individuals, it is the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for public self-insurance
of all individuals which should equal the marginal cost of an additional unit of G. The
second-order conditions are fulﬁlled by the assumptions on u and L.
2.2 Self-protection as a public good
In the self-protection case, the size of the loss L is ﬁxed and uniform for all individuals.
Now the collective eﬀort G reduces the probability of the loss for all individuals which will
be denoted by p(G). The probability of a bad state can be reduced by contributing to
the public good. For the relationship between the public good level and the probability of
the bad state, we again assume realistically that increasing G reduces its probability with
diminishing returns: p0(G) < 0 and p00(G) > 0. We further assume that it pays to invest in
the reduction of the loss probability, i. e. limG→0 p0(G) → −∞, and that it does not pay
to spend all income on self-protection eﬀort, i. e. limy→0 u0(y) → ∞. Additionally, in the
self-protection case we need to assume that the probability p(G) of the bad state of the
world is suﬃciently small. The loss is relatively seldom in the following sense:
Assumption 1
The slope of the line connecting the utility levels in the good and in the bad states of the
world is larger than the average of the slopes at those utility levels, i. e., than the expected





i > 0. (10)
A similar condition applies to the slope of the line connecting the marginal utility levels
in the good and in the bad states of the world, which is smaller than the average of the








i < 0. (11)
The ﬁrst part of Assumption 1 concerns the slopes of the utility function, while the second
part concerns analogously the case of marginal utility function. Notice that for a concave
utility function, both equations (10) and (11) are always fulﬁlled if p → 0 and are never
fulﬁlled if p → 1.
The state contingent income levels are given by
yi1 = mi − gi (12)
yi2 = mi − gi − L, (13)
6where G acts as an self-protection device by aﬀecting the probabilities of the good and
the bad state of the world. Note that self-protection does not involve the redistribution of
income. Since the absolute size of the loss does not change, self-protection expenditures
even increase the relative size of the loss.
The individual i maximizes her expected utility given by
EUi(gi,G) = (1−p(G))U(m1−g1)+p(G)U(m1−g1−L) = (1−p(G))Ui1+p(G)Ui2. (14)
Notice that, strictly speaking, we use the same notation Ui1 and Ui2 for the diﬀerent settings
self-insurance and self-protection. Since it is always clear how the utility argument looks
like, we will use this notation for the sake of a clear exposition with parsimonious notation.
The ﬁrst-best, Pareto eﬃcient outcome is found when the expected utility level of individual
1 EU1 is maximized given the restrictions that individuals 2 to n obtain given expected
utility levels EUj,j = 2,...,n and that G =
Pn
i=1 gi. The resulting Lagrangian for the
self-protection problem is
L = EU1 +
n X
j=2
























i1) + λ = 0, for i = 1,...,n, (17)
where again µ1 = 1, the superscript ∗ stands for eﬃciency and the subscript SP for
self-protection. We obtain analogously to the self-insurance case
Proposition 2 (Eﬃcient level of public self-protection)
The Pareto eﬃcient level of a public good G which acts as a self-protection device is given








where the Inada assumptions imply that (−p0(G∗
SP)) · L > 1, i. e., that the expected
marginal value of the eﬃcient self-protection eﬀort level is larger than its marginal cost.
This condition resembles again the Samuelson condition. Since the reduction in the prob-
ability of the loss accrues to all individuals, the left hand side is the sum of the marginal
7willingness to pay of all individuals for this reduction. The marginal willingness to pay
is the diﬀerence in utility between both states of the world, weighted with the marginal
change in the probability of the loss and measured in units of forgone income as given by
the marginal expected utility EU0
i in the denominator. This sum of marginal beneﬁts must
equal the right hand side, which is the marginal cost of the public good.
As usual in the self-protection (and moral hazard) literature, under the assumptions made
so far the second-order condition does not always hold.4 In the following, we assume
the Hessian matrix H(L) of the Lagrangian function to be negative deﬁnite, therefore
conditions (18) describe the Pareto eﬃcient outcome.
3 Comparative statics of risk behavior and income
In the following we will analyze the comparative static eﬀects of increasing income and
increasing risk aversion. It turns out that the eﬀect of increased risk inﬂuences the inter-
action of public self-insurance and self-protection with market insurance, while the income
comparative statics results aﬀect the interaction of public self-insurance and self-protection
with private provision eﬀorts.
3.1 The eﬀect of risk behavior
Another important eﬀect is the role of the attitude towards risk. How does the eﬃcient
level of provision of the public good change when society becomes more risk-averse? For
answering this question, we adapt an approach of Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985). Suppose
the utility function V represents more risk-averse preferences than the utility function U.
Then, according to Pratt (1964), there exists a function f with f0(·) > 0 and f00(·) < 0
such that V = f(U).
(i) The case of self-insurance
Under the same endowed incomes and size of loss as in section 2.1, the appropriate ﬁrst-







i2 + (1 − p)f0(Ui1)U0
i1
= 1 (19)
4See, e. g., Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and Shavell (1979).
8and characterizes the eﬃcient level ˜ G∗
SI, where the tilde denotes the increased risk aversion.
Now, we substitute the original G∗







i2 + (1 − p)f0(Ui1)U0
i1
> 1 (20)
holds, then ˜ G∗
SI > G∗
SI follows. The intuition of (20) is straightforward. The current level
of the public self-insurance is G∗
SI, and the cost of an additional unit of G is 1. But as
society has become more risk-averse, the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for public
self-insurance of all individuals exceeds the additional cost. Hence, the eﬃcient level of
the provision of the public good must be higher than G∗
SI.
(ii) The case of self-protection
For an increase in risk-aversion, consider again a concave transformation as described






i2 + (1 − p)f0(Ui1)U0
i1
= 1 (21)
and gives ˜ G∗
SP. Now, substitute G∗






i2 + (1 − p)f0(Ui1)U0
i1
> 1 (22)
is fulﬁlled, we must have ˜ G∗
SP > G∗
SP. As before, the sum of the marginal willingness to
pay in this more risk-averse society exceeds the additional cost for unit of G at the level
G∗
SP.
Lemma 1 (Eﬀect of risk behavior on self-insurance and self-protection)
Increasing risk aversion as reﬂected by a concave transformation of the original utility
function leads to higher eﬃcient levels of public self-insurance and public self-protection.
For both situations, an increase in risk aversion leads to a higher eﬃcient level of the public
good. Naturally, this result also means that when the individuals become less risk-averse,
the eﬃcient provision level of public self-insurance decreases. This will be an important
case in the following sections.
3.2 The eﬀect of income
To derive the comparative statics of the ﬁrst best results given in Propositions 1 and 2,
i.e., how the eﬃcient provision level of the public good G reacts to a change in income mi,
9dG









If the ﬁrst-order conditions fulﬁll the suﬃcient conditions for a maximum, the denominator
is negative. Therefore, the sign of dG
dmi depends on the sign of ∂FOC
∂mi .
(i) The case of self-insurance





















It suﬃces to consider only one addend. The sign of each addend depends on the sign of
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(A1 − A2) (25)
where A1 and A2 denote the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk aversions calculated




ij (Pratt, 1964). Thus, the eﬀect
of an income change on the eﬃcient public level of self-insurance depends on how the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion changes with income.
Lemma 2 (Eﬀect of income on public self-insurance)
If income rises, the eﬃcient provision of public self-insurance depends on how the Arrow-
Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion Aj,j = 1,2 changes with income:
1. stays constant for constant absolute risk aversion (CARA): A1 = A2.
2. increases for increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA): A1 > A2.
3. decreases for decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA): A1 < A2.
(ii) The case of self-protection
For self-protection, we can proceed in an analogous way and take the partial derivative of
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where we have used Assumption 1 and −p0(G∗
SP)L > 1 follows from the FOC (18) and the
Inada assumptions. Thus, expression (26) is negative:
Lemma 3 (Eﬀect of income on public self-protection)
Given Assumption 1, the eﬃcient provision of public self-protection is decreasing in income.
4 Eﬃcient provision with market insurance
Up to now, we have conﬁned our analysis to a setting in which only a public insurance
via the public good exists. However, it may also be possible to cover the loss, to some
extent, by buying private market insurance. In the case of ﬁre stations, one may buy ﬁre
insurance. In the case of shipwreck, one may privately insure the ship and the load. How
does the availability of market insurance inﬂuence the eﬃcient level of provision of the
public good? In a ﬁrst step, we will analyze the eﬃcient provision level if both market
insurance and self-insurance or self-protection are available, the latter two as public goods.
Individual i can buy coverage si ∈ [0,L] at a uniform price π, and can contribute to the
public device G at the marginal cost of 1. For coverage si, a premium of πsi has to be
paid. Since we want to focus on the relationship between public insurance through the
public good and private market insurance, we assume that market insurance is fair; i. e.,
the expected payoﬀ of the insurance is zero. Hence, its price equals the probability of a
loss. Our results carry over with only quantitative changes if we assume a positive loading
factor when buying insurance.
4.1 Eﬃcient self-insurance with market insurance
Since the individuals have the possibility to insure the loss at a fair premium, a risk averse
subject will always choose to buy full insurance. In the case of self-insurance fair private
11insurance means π = p. The resulting utility level is given by
Ui(gi) = U(mi − gi − pL(G)), for i = 1,...,n. (27)
Eﬃcient public self-insurance can be derived by maximizing the following Lagrangian:
L = U1 +
n X
j=2




















i + λ = 0, for i = 1,...,n, (30)
where µ1 = 1 and a hat indicates the eﬃcient public good level that is obtained in the











SI)) + λ = 0. (31)
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Eﬃcient public self-insurance with market insurance)
If beside public self-insurance fair market insurance is available, the Pareto eﬃcient level





SI)) = 1. (32)
The left hand side of condition (32) is the expected marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit
of self-insurance, while the right hand side is its marginal cost. Since G is a public good,
the expected marginal beneﬁt p(−L0( ˆ G∗
SI)) accrues to all n individuals and thus has to be
multiplied by n.
After having determined the eﬃciency condition it is now of practical interest to analyze
if the eﬃcient provision level of the public good has changed due to the availability of
market insurance. Considering again the case of conﬂagration, we are interested to see
how buying ﬁre insurance aﬀects the eﬃcient spending on collective ﬁre ﬁghting squads.
Consequently, one has to compare the eﬃcient public good levels G∗
SI and ˆ G∗
SI resulting
from conditions (9) and (32).
12On both right hand sides of the conditions (9) and (32) we have 1, the marginal cost of an












As income is lower in state 2, marginal utility U0
i2 is greater than expected marginal utility,
which is the probability average of both marginal utilities. Thus, all the fraction summands










SI > ˆ G
∗
SI (35)
The availability of private insurance decreases the eﬃcient provision level of the public self-
insurance. Given that fair market insurance is available, the individuals behave as if they
were risk neutral expected income maximizers. This changes the eﬃcient equilibrium level
GSI in the direction established in section 3.1. A decrease in risk aversion decreases the
eﬃcient provision level of public self-insurance, market insurance and public self-insurance
are strategic substitutes.
4.2 Eﬃcient self-protection with market insurance
In the self-protection case, the individuals analogously choose to buy full fair insurance at
a price of π = p(G). This leads to utility
Ui(gi) = U(mi − gi − p(G)L), for i = 1,...,n, (36)
The resulting Lagrangian for this problem is
L = U1 +
n X
j=2




















i − λ = 0, for i = 1,...,n, (39)











SP)L) + λ = 0, (40)
which leads to the following proposition:
13Proposition 4 (Eﬃcient public self-protection with market insurance)
If beside self-protection fair market insurance is available, then the Pareto eﬃcient level of





SP))L = 1. (41)
Condition (41) can be interpreted as follows. The left hand side is the expected marginal
beneﬁt of an additional unit of the self-protection public good to the n individuals, while
the right hand side is its marginal cost.
To compare the eﬃcient public good levels G∗
SP and ˆ G∗
SP without and with market insur-
































SP > ˆ G
∗
SP. (44)
By Assumption 1, market insurance and public self-protection are also strategic substitutes.
It is plausible to assume that the publicly provided level of self-protection can be observed
better (because it is provided publicly by the state) than private self-protection eﬀort. Thus
it can be observed by private insurers who reduce risk premia in an actuarial fair way. This
means that the moral hazard problem does not occur in the case of public self-protection,
which may be an advantage compared to private self-protection expenditures.
5 Private provision of self-insurance and self-protection
as public goods
Suppose now that there are n > 1 individuals, but there is no social planner or other
coordinating institution who might provide the eﬃcient provision level of the insurance
public good G. Thus, the individuals contribute privately to the public good. In this
setting, we make two assumptions. As usual in most private provision games, we assume
14Nash behavior, i. e. the individuals take the contributions of the other players as given
and react to the others’ behavior with their best response. We will denote the resulting
equilibrium levels with the superscript N for Nash. Additionally, we make the simplifying
assumption that all individuals are rich enough to be contributors, or, alternatively, that
income is so evenly distributed such that there are no pure free-riders in our game and all
individuals are included in the set of contributors. This assumption means that, in equi-
librium, all individuals are at an inner solution and allows us to disregard corner solutions.
As a by-product, assuming that all individuals are included in the set of contributors ex-
cludes the anomaly of overprovision of a public good (see Buchholz and Peters, 2001). This
assumption implies no loss of generality for our results below and, by greatly simplifying
the analysis, allows us to focus on the interaction between the private contributions to the
public good and the contributions to market insurance.
5.1 Private provision of self-insurance
Each individual i maximizes her expected utility EUi by her choice of gi, taking the






SI−gi is the sum of the contributions of all other individuals








−i + gi)) + (1 − p)U
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= 1, i = 1,...,n. (46)
To express the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost with respect to the public good the











Each individual i contributes until the marginal beneﬁt of an additional investment in the
public good to reduce the size of the loss (left hand side) equals the marginal cost of this
additional spending on the public good, which accrues in both states of the world (right















SI)) + (1 − p)U00
i1
. (48)
The slope (48) of the reaction function is negative, which means that GSI
−i and one’s own
contribution gi are substitutes, a standard result of the theory of private provision of public
15goods. It obtains because both numerator and denominator in (48) are negative. Whether
the slope is larger or smaller than -1 (i. e., whether one under or overcompensates the
contributions of the other individuals) depends on the measure of absolute risk aversion.
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For the slope (48) to lie between -1 and 0, this diﬀerence must be negative, i. e., the































which establishes the following
Lemma 4 (Privately provided self-insurance)
The slope of the reaction function in a setting of private provision of self-insurance depends
on how the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion Aj,j = 1,2 changes with income:
1. is equal to -1 for constant absolute risk aversion (CARA): A1 = A2.
2. is smaller than -1 for increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA): A1 > A2.
3. lies between -1 and 0 for decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA): A1 < A2.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium of privately provided self-insurance)
For individuals with decreasing absolute risk aversion, the private provision Nash equilib-
rium of self-insurance contributions exists and is unique. It leads to a privately provided
level of a public good GN
SI which is smaller than the Pareto-eﬃcient level G∗
SI.
Proof. By Lemma 4, for decreasing absolute risk aversion the slope of the reaction function
(48) lies between -1 and 0. Thus the reaction of individual i to a change in the sum of the
contributions of the other individuals G−i is normal in the sense of Cornes et al. (1999), who
show that this normality ensures existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. If all individuals
16are included in the set of contributors (which means that all individuals are rich enough
to contribute or, alternatively, that income is distributed evenly enough), there can be no
underprovision anomaly, so the privately provided provision level is subeﬃcient (Buchholz
and Peters, 2001). QED.
This result conﬁrms the usual intuition in private provision games. The contributions to
GSI
−i and GSP
−i by the other players but i represent a de facto income transfer to i. While
the eﬃciency conditions (9) require the sum of the willingness to pay of all individuals to
equal the marginal cost of providing the public good, an individually rational contributor
only takes into consideration the eﬀect of his contribution on his individual utility, which
decreases the resulting equilibrium cases for both self-insurance and self-protection.
5.2 Private provision of self-protection
In an analogous way, in the self-protection case each individual i maximizes her expected
utility EUi by her choice of gi, taking the contributions of the other n − 1 individuals,
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= 1, i = 1,...,n. (51)
To express the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost with respect to the public good the













Each individual i contributes until the marginal beneﬁt of an additional investment in the
public good to reduce the probability of the loss (left hand side) equals the marginal cost
of this additional spending on the public good, which accrues in both states of the world
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The denominator is negative by the second order condition. The sign of the diﬀerence































Thus, the numerator is also negative and larger than the denominator in absolute terms.
If the second order condition is fulﬁlled, the slope (53) of the reaction function is negative,
which again means that GSP
−i and one’s own contribution gi are substitutes and, remarkably,
the slope (53) is smaller than -1:
Lemma 5 (Privately provided self-protection)
The slope of the reaction function in a setting of private provision of self-protection is
smaller than -1 if the second order condition and Assumption 1 are fulﬁlled.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium of privately provided self-protection)
There exists a private provision Nash equilibrium of private self-protection contributions.
Proof. The existence proof follows Bergstrom et al. (1986). The conditions (50) deﬁne
a best-response function which is a mapping of the compact and convex set [0,mi] to
itself. By Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem there must exist a ﬁxed point, which is a Nash
equilibrium of the contributions gi,i = 1,...,n. QED.
This result without uniqueness of equilibria is analogous to Ihori and McGuire (2007)’s
multiple equilibria result. The missing normality and the multiplicity of equilibria does
not allow to establish a general result regarding the underprovision of self-protection as a
public good.
6 Interaction of private provision with market insurance
In the following, we analyze the interaction between a public good that is privately provided
and private market insurance and specially whether it is individually optimal to contribute
to a public good which acts as an insurance device when private insurance is available.
6.1 Market insurance and self-insurance
Individual i maximizes her expected utility
EUi(gi,G,si) = pU(mi − gi − L(G) + (1 − π)si) + (1 − p)U(mi − gi − πsi) (54)
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i2(1 − π) − (1 − p)U
0
i1π = 0, (56)
the second-order conditions are fulﬁlled for U00
i < 0 and L00 > 0 as assumed. We write ˆ GN
SI
for the Nash equilibrium level of the public good in the self-insurance case with market





−1 − L0( ˆ GN
SI)
. (57)
The optimum is reached when the shadow price of self-insurance, as given by the right
hand side, is equal to the market price of insurance (left hand side). In other words, the
individual is indiﬀerent whether to spend an additional unit of income in self-insurance or
market insurance. If the price for market insurance is fair, π = p, condition (57) leads to
Proposition 7 (Private provision of self-insurance with market insurance)
The privately provided eﬃcient level of a public good G, which acts as a self-insurance
device, in the presence of market insurance is implicitly deﬁned by
1





⇐⇒ p · (−L
0( ˆ G
N
SI)) = 1. (58)
Condition (58) is also the condition that maximizes expected income. However, in contrast
to the eﬃcient provision, expected income is maximized at the individual and not at the
social level. We can calculate the comparative static eﬀect of π on the ﬁrst-order conditions
(55) and (56). Let D be the determinant of the maximization problem (54). By the second-
order condition and our assumptions, we have D = FOCgg·FOCss−(FOCgs)2 > 0, where
the index denotes the partial derivative(s) with respect to the corresponding variable(s).

























Thus, market insurance and self-insurance are strategic substitutes in the sense that a
market price increase in market insurance decreases the demand for market insurance and
increases the demand for self-insurance, which has become relatively cheaper.
19Condition (58) deﬁnes implicitly a private provision level ˆ GN
SI of public self-insurance in
the presence of market insurance, which can be compared with the privately provided
provision level GN













































Thus, the possibility of buying market insurance and the strategic substitutability between
self-insurance and market insurance decreases the privately provided level of the public
good further.
To compare the eﬃcient and the private provision level of self-insurance when market
insurance is available, we use conditions (32) and (58). Since the eﬃciency condition (32)
contains the size n of the population that beneﬁts from public self-insurance and the private
provision condition (58) does not reﬂect the positive external eﬀect of the public good,
ˆ G
N
SI < ˆ G
∗
SI. (65)
Combining results (35), section 5.1, (64), and (65), we obtain the following rankings for















6.2 Market insurance and self-protection
When the public good acts as a self-protection device the fair price for market insurance
is given by π = p(G). Hence, the public good does not only - to some extent - protect
individuals, but decreases also the price of the insurance. However, as insurance is assumed
to be fair, individuals always fully insure. In the case of a positive loading it depends on
20the intensity of competition whether a probability reduction leads to a reduction of the
insurance price or not.
The individual maximizes her expected utility
EUi(gi,G,si) = p(G)U(mi −gi −L+(1−p(G))si)+(1−p(G))U(mi −gi −p(G)si) (68)
by simultaneously choosing gi and si. The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
∂EUi
∂si
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In the ﬁrst condition, the probabilities cancel out and we obtain U0
i1 = U0
i2, i. e., equal
income in both states of the world: When insurance is fair, the individuals choose full
cover si = L independently of the additional self-protection eﬀort. Since Ui1 = Ui2, the
second condition simpliﬁes to
Proposition 8 (Private provision of self-protection with market insurance)
The privately provided eﬃcient level of a public good G, which acts as a self-protection




SP)L = 1. (71)
We can compare the Nash private provision equilibrium without market insurance as de-
ﬁned by (51) with the corresponding private provision equilibrium when market insurance






















SP > ˆ G
N
SP (74)
then market insurance reduces further the private provision level of the public good.
To compare the eﬃcient and the private provision level of self-protection when market
insurance is available, conditions (41) and (71) are relevant. As in the case of self-insurance,
21the eﬃciency condition (41) contains the size n of the population that beneﬁts from public
self-insurance and the private provision condition (71) does not reﬂect the positive external
eﬀect of the public good, the private provision level is ineﬃciently small:
ˆ G
N
SP < ˆ G
∗
SP. (75)















Many public goods provide utility to the society only due to an insurance eﬀect of reducing
the size or probability of possible losses. This loss or probability reduction beneﬁts all
individuals and is a public good. Our paper extends and combines two strands of the
literature: the public goods literature including the eﬃcient and the private provision of
public goods and the self-insurance and self-protection literature.
In a very intuitive way, more risk averse societies prefer higher levels of self-insurance and
self-protection as public goods. In contrast to the standard framework, the comparative
static eﬀects of income are more elaborated. We show how the “normality” concept of the
public goods literature can be interpreted in our risk model as decreasing absolute risk
aversion (in the self-insurance case) and as a condition of the probability of the loss (in the
self-protection case). These condition highlight the theoretical similarities and diﬀerences
that our model brings out.
An interesting aspect of regarding public goods as insurance devices is the interaction
with market insurance. The presence of market insurance decreases eﬃcient provision
of the public good since fully insured subjects behave as if they were risk neutral. The
private provision of public goods is also reduced by the availability of market insurance.
The publicly provided level of the public good will, in general, be observable by insurers.
Consequently, in the case of self-protection, public goods may be superior to private self-
protection activities if moral hazard problems are involved where private self-protection
eﬀort may be diﬃcult to monitor.
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